![]() The product builds on Chatham House’s previous publication relating to Russian state and foreign policy, Myths and misconceptions in the debate on Russia (May 2021). ![]() ![]() Some of these misconceptions may have major implications for any future confrontation between Russia and one or more other countries, including NATO members. In particular it aims to challenge some of the ideas about Russian military power and doctrine which have become entrenched among non-specialists but are based on false premises or a misreading of Russia’s own aims, objectives and methods. This Chatham House product aims to address some of the longer-term conceptual challenges in understanding Russian hard power, which are not directly linked to current operations in Ukraine. In many cases the ‘myths’ are already widely debunked within the expert community but remain prevalent in broader policy and media discussion of Russia, and so present a continuing danger to informed and evidence-based policymaking. They negatively influence the shaping of opinions on Russia’s military capabilities and intentions, and therefore risk distorting responses to them. In fact, even after close observation of Russian performance in Ukraine, misconceptions about Russia’s military thinking and planning continue to distort the Western policy debate and pervade the media. But new questions over the accuracy and utility of foreign assessments of Russian military power have added to, rather than replaced, a series of open issues which have divided observers of the Russian Armed Forces for years.Īs author Oscar Jonsson notes in this study, ‘the field of Russian military studies has been saturated with definitional debates since 2014’. Russia’s war on Ukraine has reignited debate on Russia’s military capabilities and the way in which Russia intends – or hopes – to use them.
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